報告題目1：Responsive pricing and impact of information precision in supply chain with demand information asymmetry
報告摘要: The market demand is often complicated and fluctuating, which poses a challenge for trading between enterprises. In supply chain members, a manufacturerprovides its retailer with basic product characteristics, including quality,performance and other information, to help the latter better understand and predictmarket demand and then make efficient supply chain decisions. However, theretailer has no incentive to share the demand information with the manufacturer.That is, the manufacturer’ help can leave itslef at a (information) disadvantage. Sothe manufacturer needs to take risks in providing information. How accurateshould the manufacturer provide information to the retailer in order to keep itsprofits from losing? This paper develops a supply chain model consisting of asingle manufacturer and a single retailer. Because the retailer are closer toconsumers, the retailer is more likely to obtain more information through its owninformation systems. The manufacturer also provides the retailer with productinformation. There are two kinds of market demand signals which can be observedby the retailer before making ordering decisions. One is to predict that the marketwill be a high demand, the other is to predict that the market will be a low demand,but the signals are not necessarily completely accurate. We use informationaccuracy to measure the accuracy of the signals. After receiving the signal, theretailer determines its order quantity according to the wholesale price given by themanufacturer. After the uncertainty of market demand is eliminated, the retailermakes a responsive pricing and decides on the retail price of its products. The focus of this paper is to study whether responsive pricing and improvinginformation accuracy are beneficial to the manufacturer’ profit.In this paper, we first consider the case when the manufacturer’s production cost isnot zero. According to whether the retailer has product leftover when the realmarket demand is low, and whether the retailer chooses to order after getting thesignal of low market demand, we divide the problem into five different situationsand derive the optimal solutions and objective functions. Next, in order to achieve
more profound managerial insights, we further assume that the manufacturer’sproduction cost is equal to zero. Therefore, the function expression is simplified,and the existence conditions of five situations and the order of occurrence with thechange of information accuracy are analyzed. The research results show that, thechange of the manufacturer’s profit function on information accuracy is notmonotonous, and the retailer’s profit function is generally a piecewise incrementalfunction on information accuracy. When the market volatility is relatively large,there is a critical value of information accuracy. On the left side of the criticalvalue, there may be a situation where the manufacturer’s profit decreases with theincrease of information accuracy. The improvement of information accuracy on theright side of the critical value is beneficial to both the retailer and the manufacturer. That is to say, when the accuracy of information exceeds the critical value, thehigher the accuracy of information provided by manufacturers to retailers, thehigher their profits will be.
報告人簡介：王建才博士現為北京理工大濟管理學院學院教授，曾為香港大學研究助理教授，主要研究方向為運營及供應鏈管理，在Information and Management, European Journal of Operational Research, InternationalJournal of Production Research, IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, Journal of the Operational Research Society, International Transactions in Operational Research等SCI/SSCI國際權威期刊上發表論文30。
報告題目2：Equilibrium financing strategy in a two-echelon supply chain with a capital constrained retailer
報告摘要：This paper considers a supply chain consisting of one supplier and one capital constrained retailer and investigates the impact of different financing formats on both the optimal decision-making and profit of supply chain members.We mainly examine three financing formats: bank credit, trade credit, and hybrid credit. After presenting the optimal solutions and developing the equilibrium results analytically, we find that, although the retailer’s and the supplier’s preferences for financing formats jointly depends on the bank interest and trade interest, there is an equilibrium area in which both retailer and supplier are better-off if only trade credit is applied even if the bank interest is less than the trade interest. Furthermore, the equilibrium area becomes smaller with the increasing of initial capital. In numerical study, we examine the impact of credit interest rate, initial capital, and financing ratio on the optimal solutions.It is interesting to find that no matter which financing format the retailer chooses, with the increasing of the trade credit rate or bank credit rate, the supplier will reduce the wholesale price to stimulate the retailer to decrease the selling price directly and to increase the demand indirectly.In addition, in trade credit, the retailer’s profit increases with the increasing of trade credit interest rate, but the supplier’s profit decreases with the trade credit interest rate.
報告人簡介：陶峰博士現為華東理工大學商學院教授，上海市浦江人才獲得者。主要研究方向為調度，庫存控制，以及供應鏈管理等，在InternationalJournal of Production Research, IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, Journal of the Operational Research Society, International Transactions in Operational Research等SCI/SSCI國際權威期刊上發表多篇論文。